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Introduction 
Is vision merely a state of the beholder’s sensory organ which can be explained as an 
immediate effect caused by external sensible objects? Or is it rather a successive process 
in which the observer actively scanning the surrounding environment plays a major part? 
These two general attitudes towards visual perception were both developed already by 
ancient thinkers. The former is embraced by natural philosophers (e.g., atomists and 
Aristotelians) and is often labelled “intromissionist”, based on their assumption that 
vision is an outcome of the causal influence exerted by an external object upon a sensory 
organ receiving an entity from the object. The latter attitude to vision as a successive 
process is rather linked to the “extramissionist” theories of the proponents of geometrical 
optics (such as Euclid or Ptolemy) who suggest that an entity – a visual ray – is sent forth 
from the eyes to the object.1 
The present paper focuses on the contributions to this ancient controversy 
proposed by some 13th-century Latin thinkers. In contemporary historiography of 
medieval Latin philosophy, the general narrative is that whereas thinkers in the 12th 
century held various (mostly Platonic) versions of the extramission theory, the situation 
changes during the first half of the 13th century when texts by Avicenna, Aristotle (with 
the commentaries by Averroes), and especially Alhacen, who all favour the 
intromissionist paradigm, were gradually assimilated.2 It is assumed that, as a result, 
 
1 For an account of the ancient theories of vision based on this line of conflict see especially D. C. Lindberg, 
Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976, pp. 1-17 and A. M. 
Smith, From Sight to Light: The Passage from Ancient to Modern Optics, Chicago – London, The University 
of Chicago Press, 2015, pp. 23-75. 
2 For these authors’ criticism of extramission see e.g. Lindberg, Theories of Vision, pp. 44–49 (Avicenna), 
pp. 53–54 (Averroes), pp. 61–67 (Alhacen). 
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since ca. 1250 the intromissionist account was universally accepted by most Latin 
thinkers while extramission came to be regarded as a strange, eccentric, and antiquated 
theory – and the whole controversy became outdated.3 
The present paper aims to somewhat amend this narrative. It argues that the 
extramissionist theory was taken quite seriously by many 13th-century thinkers (at least 
as a more or less sophisticated theory one should deal with and argue against) and even 
may have some merits in explaining the visual process. The attitudes towards 
extramission held by the 13th-century Latin thinkers investigated in the paper can 
broadly be divided into three categories: refutation, where the best example is Albert the 
Great (especially his works written in the 1240s and 1250s); syncretic tendencies to 
incorporate some extramissionist tenets into a broader intromissionist framework 
obvious especially in Roger Bacon (in his works written in the 1260s); and, finally, an 
open-minded rethinking and reformulation of the theory which, as I will argue, may be 
found in Peter Olivi (especially in various questions he wrote in the 1270s and early 
1280s). As I will argue, while the traditional narrative is without doubt true in the general 
contour, these three figures do not fit into it. It is not true without qualification that the 
controversy between intromission and extramission had become antiquated already in 
the mid-13th century due to the “Alhacenian turn” – Bacon and Olivi still take the 
extramission postulate very seriously later in that century. 
 
1. Extramission, Its Varieties, and Merits 
Before these three medieval thinkers’ accounts of vision can be considered, it ought to be 
elucidated 1) what an extramissionist theory amounts to, 2) what kinds of 
extramissionist involvement are present in theories of vision contemporary to the three 
thinkers investigated here, and 3) why an extramissionist theory may be challenging and 
interesting. 
 
3 For a concise but broadly conceived instance of such a traditional narrative see D. N. Hasse, “Pietro 
d’Abano’s Conciliator and the Theory of the Soul in Paris,” in A. Aertsen, K. Emory, and A. Speer (eds), Nach 
der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 
13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2001, pp. 645-647. For more details, see 
Lindberg, Theories of Vision, pp. 87-121; Smith, From Sight to Light, pp. 228-277. 
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What are the distinctive features of extramissionist theories of vision? At least 
four general tenets can be pointed out:4 
1) The extramission postulate. These theories share the assumption that 
visual perception consists in (or at least includes) the perceiver “extending” 
outwards to the visible object in a special way. This extension is often articulated 
by postulating an entity that issues from the eyes and reaches the object. In most 
authors, what is emitted is something material, albeit very subtle – e.g. the inner 
light of the Platonists, the visual ray of the Euclidians, or the visual spirit or 
pneuma of the Galenists. 
2) The primacy of visual activity. As implied in the extramission postulate, the 
visual organ is active and plays a primary role in the visual process, which begins 
not because an external object affects the eye (which processes the affection in 
response), but because the eye itself acts first and reaches the object by means 
of something emitted. The primacy of the eye’s activity is sometimes stressed by 
advocating the eye movements and the consequent focusing of attention.5 
3) Reducing vision to establishing a cognitive contact. Vision is explained as 
establishing a contact between the observer and the object and often interpreted 
in haptic terms. The contact is ensured by the entity emitted from the eyes and 
hence vision is very much like a kind of touch: as the famous Stoic metaphor says, 
we see a thing by means of a pneuma just like a blind man “sees” by means of a 
cane.6 
 
4 For a clear depiction of the grades of extramissive involvement in a visual theory see M. E. Kalderon, 
“Perception and Extramission in De quantitate animae,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 
(forthcoming). 
5 E.g. Chalcidius, Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, J. H. Waszink (ed), London – 
Leiden, Brill, 1975, (hereafter In Tim.), 10, § 238, p. 251. 
6 This feature of extramissionist theories is stressed, e.g., by Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis, 
Nemesii episcopi Premnon physicon sive Peri physeōs anthrōpoy liber a N. Alfano archiepiscopo Salerni in 
Latinum translatus, C. Burkhard (ed), Leipzig, Teubner, 1917, 7, 75 (who mentions Hipparchus’s 
comparison of the eye with its rays to a hand grasping a thing); Albertus Magnus, De homine, H. Anzulewicz 
and J. R. Söder (eds), Alberti Magni Opera Omnia XXVII.2, Münster, Aschendorff, 2008, 187b, 194b, 195b. 
Cf. Kalderon, “Perception and Extramission in De quantitate animae” who stresses that this condition in 
particular must be fulfilled for a theory to be called “extramissionist”. 
4 
 
4) Use of geometry. Extramissionist theories often (but not exclusively) 
describe vision in geometrical terms – a visual cone is postulated with the base 
on the object seen and the apex in the eye.7 
It is worth noting that several degrees of commitment to the extramission 
postulate are present in the visual theories commonly known or elaborated in Latin 
philosophy of the 12th and 13th century. First, there is (A) a genuine extramissionist 
explanation of vision – visual ray theories. These theories postulate visual rays emanating 
from the eyes towards the objects. The most prominent examples are (A1) the works on 
geometrical optics translated into Latin during the 12th and 13th century – Euclid’s De visu 
and De speculis with a compilation De speculis falsely ascribed to Euclid, Ptolemy’s Optics 
and Al-Kindí’s De aspectibus. The visual theories expounded in these works display all of 
the aforementioned features. 
Medieval scholars extrapolated a slightly different version of the visual ray 
theory also (A2) from Platonic philosophy, especially Plato’s Timaeus, where a fiery 
nature is ascribed to the eyes with the consequence that they emit a special kind of light 
which coalesces with daylight to form a continuous body between the observer and the 
seen object. Such a ray theory is also ascribed to Augustine, at least by some Latin 
thinkers.8 This Platonic version of the visual ray theory includes tenets 1)-3) but does not 
make use of geometry. As Albert the Great points out, this is the main difference between 
Euclidians and Platonists: whereas Euclidians explain the fact that distant things are seen 
poorly by the small angle included between the lateral rays of the visual cone, Platonists 
 
7 There is no single understanding of the properties of such a visual cone. For a general survey of the issue 
among late ancient geometricians see H. Siebert, “Transformation of Euclid’s Optics in Late Antiquity,” 
Nuncius, vol 29, no. 1, 2014, especially pp. 90-94, 106-123. 
8 Augustine is commended as a proponent of extramission by Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, in Roger Bacon and 
the Origins of Perspectiva in the Middle Ages, D. C. Lindberg (ed and trans.), Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1996, (hereafter Persp.), I.7.2, 100 and criticized for the same reason by Petrus Iohannis Olivi, 
Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, B. Jansen (ed), Quaracchi, Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 
1922–26, (hereafter Summa II), 58, 482–484; 73, 55–58. Roger Marston, Quodlibeta quatuor, Etzkorn, G. 
and Brady, I. (eds), Grottaferrata, Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1994, I.19, 57-58 believes that Augustine 
proposed an intromission theory of vision; Petrus Sutton (?), Quodlibeta, F. Etzkorn (ed), Franciscan 
Studies, vol. 23, 1963, I.24, 111 asserts that extramission was a position upheld by the young Augustine 
when he was first instructed (imbutus) in a Platonic doctrine, but he corrected his view later. The ascription 
of a full-fledged extramissionist theory to Augustine is convincingly refuted by Kalderon, “Perception and 
Extramission in De quantitate animae”. 
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propose that when the visual ray is obliged to stretch to a distant object, it is weakened 
and, hence, the vision is poor.9 
However, the Platonic visual theory can also be interpreted differently – as 
including not only extramission of visual rays but also an emission from the visible object. 
(After all, a pure extramissionist theory may lead to the consequence that the visual act 
is not in the eyes but on the object where the visual ray touches the object.)10 Such (B) a 
syncretic account is suggested already by Galen who stresses that Platonic theory 
includes not only an emission of internal light but also a reverse motion from the object 
to the eyes. In his view, the emitted entity is a visual pneuma that renders the intervening 
air an instrument of vision and enables the colours of the object to enter the eye.11 
Latin scholars elaborated further on such syncretic accounts involving both 
extramission and intrommision. Two versions may be discerned – a syncretic account 
with (B1) a primacy of extramission and another one with (B2) a primacy of 
intromission. The primacy of extramission was stressed by some 12th-century Platonists: 
first, a visual ray of a fiery nature is sent forth from the eyes, then it encounters the object, 
disperses over its surface, grasps its form and brings the form back to the eye.12 In the 
13th century, the same view was held by the anonymous author of the Lectura in librum 
De anima (Paris, ca. 1246-47)13 and later attributed to certain Platonici and dismissed by 
Roger Bacon, John Peckham (between 1277 and 79) and Peter Olivi.14 This kind of 
 
9 Albert, De homine, 192b-193a. 
10 A point ascribed to Augustine and criticized by Olivi, Summa II.73, 61-63. 
11 An outline of the Galenic account of vision is in Lindberg, Theories of Vision, pp. 10-11 and Smith, From 
Sight to Light, pp. 36-43. Hunajn / Constantine the African also point out that the Galenic account is in the 
middle between extra- and intromission – Constantinus Africanus, De oculis, Collectio ophthalmologica 
veterum auctorum VII, P. Pansier (ed), Paris, 1933, IV.2, 177-180. 
12 Such a position is defended by Bernard of Chartres, William of Conches, and Adelard of Bath – see Bernard 
of Chartres, Glosae super Platonem, P. E. Dutton (ed), Toronto, PIMS, 1991, II.7, p. 207; Guillelmus de 
Conchis, Glosae super Platonem, E. A. Jeauneau (ed), Turnhout, Brepols, 2006, II.137, pp. 248–249; idem, 
Dragmaticon Philosophiae, I. Ronca and A. Badia (eds), Turnhout, Brepols, 1997, VI.19.3–5, pp. 244–245; 
Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales, Conversations with his Nephew: On the Same and the Different, 
Questions on Natural Science, and On Birds, Ch. Burnett (ed and trans.), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, 23, pp. 140–142. See also Lindberg, Theories of Vision, pp. 90–94 and Smith, From Sight to 
Light, pp. 237–241. 
13 Anonymus, Lectura in librum De anima a quodam discipulo reportata, R. A. Gauthier (ed), Grottaferrata, 
Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1985, (hereafter Lectura), II.14.1, 324. 
14 Bacon, Persp. I.7.3, 102-104; John Peckham, Perspectiva communis, John Pecham and the Science of 
Optics, D. C. Lindberg (ed and trans.), University of Wisconsin Press, 1970, I.46(49), p. 128; Olivi, Summa 
II.73, 55, 59-61. 
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syncretic theory includes the extramission postulate and the primary activity of the eye 
(tenets 1)-2)), but does not reduce vision to establishing a contact by means of a visual 
ray; the form of the object must be transported to the eye. None of its proponents 
mentioned above elaborates on the geometry of vision (tenet 4)); although a visual cone 
formed by the rays is sometimes mentioned by them. 
Another kind of syncretic theory was quite prominent in the 13th century, 
especially among Franciscan thinkers. According to this theory, vision is basically 
established by intromission – but the postulate of visual rays emitted from the eyes is 
preserved (for details see Bacon below). Such a (B2) syncretic theory of vision with a 
primacy of intromission is suggested by Grosseteste (1220s), in an eclectic manner by 
Bartholomeus Anglicus (ca. 1240),15 and also by an anonymous master whose questions 
on De anima are preserved in MS Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento 138 (ca. 1240s).16 
Visual rays are also advocated in the anonymous Summa philosophiae once ascribed to 
Grosseteste (1265–1275).17 As I argue below, an elaborate version of this account is 
proposed by Roger Bacon (in early 1260s). Bacon’s version is adopted by John Peckham 
and apparently also by Roger Marston (Oxford, between 1282 and 1284).18 This 
syncretism is mocked as a peculiar novelty by Albert the Great in the 1240s and 1250s19 
and later in a quodlibet attributed to Peter Sutton.20 The position cannot be called 
 
15 Robert Grosseteste, De iride seu De iride et speculo, Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, 
Bischofs von Lincoln, L. Baur (ed), Münster, Aschendorff, 1912, pp. 72-73; Bartholomeus Anglicus, De 
proprietatibus rerum, Frankfurt, Wolfgang Richter, 1601 (hereafter DPR), III.17, 64. 
16 Anonymus, Quaestiones in De anima, MS Assisi, Bibl. Sacr. Conv. 138, fol. 253vb. On the text see Long, R. 
J., “The anonymous De Anima of Assisi, biblioteca comunale cod. 138,” in Musco, A. et al. (eds), Universalità 
della ragione. Pluralità delle filosofie nel Medioevo, vol. 2, Palermo, Officina di studi medievali, 2012, pp. 
271-280. 
17 Pseudo-Robert Grosseteste, Summa philosophiae, in L. Baur (ed), Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert 
Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, Münster, Aschendorff, 1912, XII.15-18, pp. 502-508. 
18 Peckham, Perspectiva communis I.46(49), 128-130; Roger Marston, Quodlibeta I.19, 58-59. 
19 Albert, De homine, 198a; idem, De sensu et sensato, in S. Donati (ed), Alberti Magni Opera Omnia VII.2A, 
Münster, Aschendorff, 2017 (hereafter De sensu), I.5, 28b (“novella et fatua … non opinio, sed insania”). 
Albert may have had some of his contemporaries in mind (Grosseteste and Bartholomeus Anglicus being 
the most probable options). However, it is possible that Albert actually meant a syncretism with the 
primacy of extramission – then his target would be, e.g., William of Conches. For further surmises on the 
issue cf. H. Anzulewicz, “Perspektive und Raumvorstellung in den Frühwerken des Albertus Magnus,” in J. 
A. Aertsen and A. Speer (eds), Raum und Raumvorstellungen im Mittelalter, Berlin – New York, Walter de 
Gruyter, 1998, pp. 263-264 and Hasse, “Pietro d’Abano’s Conciliator,” p. 649. 
20 Peter Sutton (?), Quodlibeta I.24, 110. While the traditional dating of the quodlibet was 1309-1311, 
recently it was suggested that it might be from the late 1280s (see M. Pickavé, “The Controversy over the 
Principle of Individuation in Medieval Quodlibeta (1277–ca. 1320): A Forest Map,” in Ch. Schabel (ed), 
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“extramissionist” except in a broad sense. Its general setting is intromissionist and with 
its stress on the primary activity of the visible object it is against tenets 2) and 3). 
However, it preserves 1) the extramission postulate and 4) the use of geometry (albeit in 
an intromissionist rendering). 
It is obvious that the extramission postulate was not a rare and eccentric feature 
of 13th-century visual theories – rather on the contrary. This list of visual theories more 
or less committed to the extramission postulate constitutes a framework for investigating 
the attitudes of Albert the Great, Roger Bacon and Peter Olivi to extramission. The most 
important question for such an investigation is their stance towards tenet 3, namely, 
whether they agree with extramission as an instrument for establishing a cognitive 
contact between the perceiver and the object seen. Hence, in examining their theories, a 
special emphasis is placed on the following two issues regarding the cognitive contact: 
First, how is the cognitive contact with the external object established? Is it by means of 
something received in the sight, or rather by something emitted from the eye? And when 
the cognitive contact is established, is it sufficient for vision to occur, or must a further 
operation be performed? Second, is there an ontological gap between the material world 
and the more or less immaterial sensory soul? If so, how is the gap bridged in the visual 
process? 
Besides these questions, the paper is guided by the query whether an 
extramissionist theory actually has any merits. Why might it be challenging? Why did so 
many medieval thinkers deal with extramission, if it is empirically doubtful? Several 
arguments in favour of the theory are often repeated by medieval authors, who seem to 
have regarded at least some of them as sound and convincing. Besides some anecdotes 
from the ancient literature (cats seeing in the dark, basilisks killing with their glance, or 
menstruating women staining the mirror with their gaze), there was also the authority of 
some ancient thinkers defending (or apparently defending) extramission: besides 
geometrical optics and Platonists, even Aristotle is sometimes referred to as a proponent 
 
Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, Leiden, Brill, 2007, p. 56; in such case 
its author cannot be Peter Sutton. 
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of visual rays (especially his De animalibus and Meteorologica).21 Theological arguments 
for extramission can also be brought up.22 
Further, the extramission postulate was traditionally connected with 
geometrical description of the visual experience. Hence, the extramissionist approach – 
with the visual cone demarcating the visual field whose size depends on the angle 
included between the rays issuing from the eye – was believed to be better equipped to 
explain how the distance, location and size of an object is perceived. However, the notion 
of a visual cone can very easily be incorporated into the intromissionist framework, as 
we will see below – hence, it does not force a thinker to uphold extramission. 
Nevertheless, the best argument for extramission is that it may describe some 
aspects of the visual process more adequately. It seems to be better equipped (than the 
intromissionist account) to explain some psychological features of the visual experience, 
e.g., attention focusing, active searching for a thing in the visual field, successive 
apprehension of a thing exceeding the boundaries of the visual field, etc. In all of these 
cases, the perceiver’s active involvement is needed, as physiologically manifested in the 
eye-movements, which the extramissionist can easily explain with reference to the 
movements of the axis of the visual cone. 
 
21 See, e.g., Pseudo-Petrus Hispanus, Expositio libri de anima, in Pedro Hispano, Obras Filosóficas III, M. 
Alonso (ed), Madrid, Instituto de filosofía “Luis Vives”, 1952, III.10, pp. 393-394 (without justification); 
Bartholomeus Anglicus, DPR III.17, 64; Anonymus, Quaestiones in De anima, MS Assisi, Bibl. Sacr. Conv. 
138, f. 253vb; Bacon, Persp. I.7.2, 100; Roger Marston, Quodlibeta I.19, 58. The Aristotelian passage often 
referred to is De generatione animalium V, 1, 781a1-2; however, the belief of medieval scholars that this 
passage is a statement of extramission seems to be based on a mistranslation – see D. C. Lindberg, Roger 
Bacon and the Origins of Perspectiva in the Middle Ages, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 359, note 
223. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s adherence to an intromissionist approach is not uncontested. The elements 
of a visual ray theory in Aristotle’s writings are briefly listed by S. Berryman, “Euclid and the Sceptic: A 
Paper on Vision, Doubt, Geometry, Light and Drunkenness,” Phronesis, vol. 43, no. 2, 1998, pp. 183-184. It 
is possible that such an attitude to visual theory prevailed in the early Peripatetic school – note that 
Chalcidius attributes the view that visual rays are emitted by the eye to both geometricians and Peripatetics 
(In Tim., 10, § 238, 250-251). 
22 For medieval thinkers, incorporeal beings such as angels or separated souls cannot be affected by any 
corporeal impulses from the outside; hence, it is possible that they see by means of extramission. Such a 
position is mentioned and refuted by Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Peckham – see Bonaventura, 
Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum, Opera omnia I-IV, Quaracchi, Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 
1882-89, IV.49.2.1.3.2, 1020b; Thomas Aquinas, Commentum in quartum librum Sententiarum, Parma, 
1858, IV.44.2.1, 315b-316a; and John Peckham, Quaestiones tractantes de anima, H. Spettmann (ed), 
Münster, Aschendorff, 1918, II.20.6, 164. The position seems to have been preferred to the theory of species 
by Olivi, Summa II.58, 489. 
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Take an example of a little penny on the floor, attributed by Nemesius of Emesa 
to “geometricians”. The perceiver may see the whole floor without noticing the penny, 
until he focuses his attention directly towards it.23 A conundrum for intromission: if the 
perceiver sees by virtue of effects caused in his sensory organs by the outside objects, he 
should see the floor and the penny at the same moment. An extramissionist has an 
advantage here: he may point out that the visual capacity is not distributed 
homogeneously in the visual cone (and hence, unlike the floor, the penny is not seen in 
the first moment) and refer to the movement of the axis (which enables the perceiver to 
see the penny as soon as the axis falls upon it). 
Therefore, an extramissionist theory raises questions concerning the temporal 
and spatial aspects of the visual process. Is vision immediate or successive? And do we 
apprehend a single entity or a number of things at once? The extramissionist stance is 
that only one thing is seen at one moment – strictly speaking, only the point touched by 
the axis of the visual cone. The visual apprehension of a thing is completed by a quick 
transportation of the axis of the visual cone, i.e., successively.24 On the contrary, 
Aristotelians insist on the view that vision is immediate – the reception of the object’s 
form is not a result of a local motion but an alteration, and hence instantaneous. Based on 
the intuition that vision is immediate, some Aristotelians point out that the successive 
propagation of the visual ray and the consequence that the vision would occur in time is 
in fact an argument against extramission, because it renders a counterintuitive 
conception of vision.25 
Therefore, the third issue considered in the following accounts of Albert, Bacon, 
and Olivi is their stance towards the temporal and spatial aspects of the visual process. 
 
 
23 Nemesius, De natura hominis, 7, 75. The same example is also in Pseudo-Euclid, De speculis, in Alkindi, 
Tideus und Pseudo-Euklid. Drei optische Werke, A. A. Björnbo and S. Vogl (eds), Leipzig – Berlin, Teubner, 
1912, 15, 106. 
24 This is how the medieval interpreted the Euclidian proposition that “nothing is seen as a whole 
simultaneously” (Euclid, De visu, W. R. Theisen (ed), “Liber de visu: The Greco-Latin Translation of Euclid’s 
Optics,” Mediaeval Studies, vol. 41, no. 1, 1979, 1, 62). 
25 See John Blund, Tractatus de anima, in Treatise on the Soul, D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt (eds), trans. M. 
W. Dunne, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, IX.101, 54; and Peter Sutton (?), Quodlibeta I.24, 110. The 
argument originates from Averroes, De sensu et sensato, Compendia librorum Aristotelis qui Parva 
naturalia vocantur, H. A. Wolfson, D. Baneth, and F. H. Fobes (eds), Cambridge, Mass., The Mediaeval 
Academy of America, 1949, p. 34. 
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2. Refutation: Albert the Great 
 
The first theory under consideration here is the Aristotelian approach developed 
by Albert the Great, which is generally dismissive towards extramission of any kind.26 
It is worth noting that Albert evidently inclined to extramission in his earliest 
theological works written in the 1230s and early 1240s. Having a foundation in Plato’s 
Timaeus and Chalcidius’s commentary on it, he assumes that vision is performed by rays 
emitted from the eyes coalescing with the external light and that the visual concentration 
depends on the close connection of the visual rays.27 Albert’s attitude towards 
extramission changed in the course of his work on the anthropological compendium De 
homine (finished in Paris around 1242) under the strong influence of Aristotle, 
Avicenna’s De anima and Averroes’s De sensu who all argued against extramission. Here 
Albert dismisses extramissionist theories for the first time and embraces an Aristotelian 
one.28 Criticism of extramission is present also in his later De sensu et sensato (written 
in Italy in 1256).29 
The reason why Albert devoted such a considerable amount of text to arguing 
against extramission may have been that – in his view – the theory was defended by not 
a few of the contemporary Latin scholars (a multis hodie defenditur).30 Thus, in his early 
 
26 On Albert’s visual theory see e.g. N. H. Steneck, “Albert on the Psychology of Sense Perception,” in J. A. 
Weisheipl (ed), Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980, Toronto, PIMS, 1980; L. 
Dewan, “St. Albert, the Sensibles, and Spiritual Being,” ibid.; on the optical issues in his works see Lindberg, 
Theories of Vision, pp. 104-107; C. Akdogan, Optics in Albert the Great’s De sensu et sensato: An Edition, 
English Translation, and Analysis, PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1978; and especially 
Anzulewicz, “Perspektive und Raumvorstellung”. On the dating of Albert’s writings see H. Anzulewicz, De 
forma resultante in speculo, 2 vols., Münster, Aschendorff, 1999, I, 6-17. 
27 A Platonic theory of vision is evident in Albert’s De natura boni (Germany, ca. 1233/34) and De 
resurrectione (Paris, before 1242). This seminal change in Albert’s visual theory is analysed in Anzulewicz, 
“Perspektive und Raumvorstellung,” pp. 252-267. 
28 De homine, 185a-189b and especially the appendix to that question on pp. 189b-202b. Note that the 
appendix is a later addition to the text, written sometimes before 1246 (see ibid., XIV). As a consequence 
of assimilating the Aristotelian framework in De homine, Albert abandoned extramission also in his 
theological works – see Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in II Sententiarum, A. Borgnet (ed), Alberti Magni 
Opera Omnia XXVII, Paris, Vivès, 1894, II.13.2, 246b (Paris, around 1246) and idem, Quaestio de sensibus 
corporis gloriosi, in Alberti Magni Opera Omnia XXV.2, A. Fries, W. Kübel, and H. Anzulewicz (eds), Münster, 
Aschendorff, 1993, 2.1, 116b-118a (after 1246 or 1249). 
29 De sensu I.7-8, 31a-39a. Albert denies extramission also in his De anima (Germany, between 1254-57) – 
Albertus Magnus, De anima, C. Stroick (ed), Alberti Magni Opera Omnia VII.1, Münster, Aschendorff, 1968, 
II.3.14, 119b. 
30 Albert, De sensu I.5, 27a; I.8, 35a. 
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De homine he argues against Plato, Euclid and Al-Kindí (he calls the latter two aspectivi, 
perhaps on the account of the title of Al-Kindí’s De aspectibus); later in his De sensu he 
uses similar arguments against Empedocles (whom he considers to be a predecessor of 
Euclid) and again Plato. His reasoning is quite extensive, albeit not particularly original. 
He heavily relies on Avicenna and Averroes.31 
From among the extramissionist tenets outlined in the introduction, Albert’s 
main target was the postulate of a material emission itself. If vision was performed by the 
emission of a material body that touches the object, a little eye must have the capacity to 
create an enormously long body reaching up to the stars, which is impossible. Further, 
since two objects cannot be in the same place, two opposite observers could not see each 
other, because their visual rays would obstruct one another. For the same reason, every 
medium such as air or water would have to be porous – filled with vacuous places for 
visual rays to penetrate them.32 Albert also assails the extramissionist assumption of the 
causal primacy of the eye. If the sensory organ were a primary active element in the visual 
process, the movements of the visual rays would fall under the commands of the will – 
the beholder would be able to emit the ray and retract it on demand. However, we 
experience that we are forced to see what is in front of us.33 
All the deficiencies of the extramission theories lead Albert to embrace an 
intromissionist theory of the Aristotelian kind. Hence, he models the visual process in 
direct opposition to the extramissionists. The entity endowed with the primary causal 
activity is not the eye, but the visible object – a colour. The object alters first the medium 
between itself and the observer and then the eye of the observer, creating its similitude 
or species in the observer’s visual power.34 As a consequence, the cognitive contact 
 
31 Albert’s borrowings from Avicenna’s De anima are well documented – see D. N. Hasse, Avicenna’s De 
Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300, London, The 
Warburg Institute, 2000, pp. 60-69; on vision pp. 124-126 and especially the analytical index on pp. 270-
279 (Albert’s borrowings from Avicenna’s De anima III). Note that Albert did not use Alhacen’s Perspectiva 
in his reasoning against extramission (he mentions him only in passing in De sensu – see Lindberg, Theories 
of Vision, pp. 106, 252) – in the 1240s and 1250s the assimilation of Alhacen was still in its early stages and 
was taking place in Oxford, rather than in Paris (see note 62 below). 
32 De homine, 194b, 195a. 
33 De homine, 197b. 
34 See, e.g., De homine, 146a-b; 185b, 189a (recognition of the Aristotelian position); De anima II.3.7, 108; 
De sensu I.5, 28b; and N. Winkler, “Zur Erkenntnislehre Alberts des Großen in seinem De anima-
Kommentar als systematische Einheit von sensus, abstractio, phantasmata, intentiones, species, universalia 
und intellectus,” Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, vol. 19, 2016, pp. 84-92. 
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between an observer and a visible object is established by the causal activity of the object 
and the species in the visual power is a principle of cognizing the thing seen.35 
The question yet to be answered is how the ontological gap between the 
corporeal object and the visual power is bridged. Although Albert is not committed to the 
view that the visual power is a part of the soul as a spiritual substance, he nonetheless 
take it to be a potency seated in the material organ36 and hence a more noble thing than 
the external object. As a consequence, there arises the problem of the so-called ascendant 
causality, i.e., how the less noble object can act upon a more noble one, if the agent is 
assumed to be more noble than the patient. 
Albert deals with the problem in his De anima37 and introduces two possible 
strategies, both assuming that the species (as a causal effect of the object) must be 
“elevated” and refined by an external agent in order to be able to affect the visual power. 
In the first account, the external agent is light; in the second it is a power of the soul that 
proceeds from the observer spiritually (egreditur spiritualiter), applies itself to the 
sensible object (supponit se sensibili), and confers being of an incorporeal and spiritual 
kind on it (confert ei esse quasi incorporeum et spirituale).38 
The former account (held, e.g., by pseudo-Peter of Spain and later by pseudo-
Grosseteste)39 seems ridiculous to Albert; light has a role only in vision, thus it cannot 
interfere in the perceptual process of other senses. Besides, the form taken in itself is an 
immaterial essence – it can act immaterially.40 The latter account, which Albert attributes 
 
For passivity of the senses in general, see e.g. De homine, 257b; De anima II.3.5, 102b-103b, and Steneck, 
“Albert on the Psychology of Sense Perception,” pp. 270-272. 
35 De homine, 185a. 
36De homine, 256a. 
37 De anima II.3.6, 104a-107b; see also Dewan, “St. Albert, the Sensibles, and Spiritual Being,” pp. 305-307. 
As A. Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent: la controverse entre Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun ses 
antécédents et son evolution, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1988, 1-3 points out this passage pertains 
to the early discussions about the so-called agent sense. Albert even refers to the famous passage by 
Averroes (Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis de anima libros, F. S. Crawford (ed), Cambridge, 
Mass., The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953 (hereafter De an.), II.60, 220f) from which these 
discussions originate. 
38 De anima II.3.6, 104b-105a. 
39 Pseudo-Hispanus, Expositio libri de anima II.11, 238-239; II.14, 277-279; pseudo-Grosseteste, Summa 
philosophiae XII.12, 496-498. 
40 De anima II.3.6, 106b. 
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to Plato, Augustine, and a few of his contemporaries (pauci modernorum),41 seems a little 
more probable to him – but he still finds it unintelligible. He confesses that he just cannot 
imagine how sensory powers could be emitted towards the sensibles.42 
Thus, Albert dismisses both solutions and declares the question itself to be 
foolish: in his view, every active potency is (ex definitione) perfectly suited to act without 
any external mover. Hence, the sensible form is able to cause its similitude in the medium 
in spiritual or intentional being, i.e. without its matter. Consequently, the ontological gap 
between the material object and the ontologically more noble visual power is bridged by 
the simple fact that the form of the object can create a spiritual or intentional species 
which, having such a refined mode of existence, is able to act on the visual power.43 
However, the intromissionist account of vision still has some problems to be 
dealt with. A proponent of Euclidian extramission still has the advantages of the 
geometrical description of vision on his side and can argue against the Aristotelian theory 
from this background. Albert is aware of this strategy and presents several arguments 
against his own position.44 
For example, if an observer sees a colour by means of an alteration caused by the 
colour first in the medium and then in his eye, why does the observer not see what is 
behind him? After all, the colours of objects behind his back alter the medium as well.45 
Albert’s general strategy is to preserve optics, but on an Aristotelian foundation: as he 
notes, although some of the assumptions of geometrical optics are false, it can be modified 
in a way that both saves the conclusions of the optical science and does not contradict 
Aristotle.46 Thus, he makes a concession to the Euclidian: he concedes that there are rays 
involved in vision that in turn make a geometrical description possible. However, these 
 
41 It is not obvious who actually held such a view. Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent, p. 3 suggests John 
Blund (Tractatus de anima VI.59, 34) and the anonymous Lectura in librum de anima (Lectura II.10.3, 277); 
however, Blund only mentions a visus agens and the Lectura assumes that the power acts upon the object 
– but neither uses the terminology employed by Albert. (Moreover, the author of the Lectura holds the same 
position as Albert: he ascribes a role in the spiritualization of the form solely to the medium – Lectura 
II.22.5, 404.) As I argue below, this account is similar to the role attributed to extramission later by Roger 
Bacon in his visual theory. 
42 De anima II.3.6, 106b-107a. 
43De anima, 106a; 107a-b. 
44 De homine, 187b-189b. 
45 De homine, 187b. 
46 Commentarii in II Sententiarum 13.2, 246b. 
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rays are not visual rays emitted from the eyes, but the rays of external light. Light has the 
power to actualize the colours and these alter the medium in the rectilinear direction. 
These very rays constitute the visual cone and determine the paths of the species the 
observer receives. The obvious consequence is that the observer can see only what is in 
front of him.47 Such a reinterpretation of the nature of the visual cone also enables Albert 
to preserve the validity of Euclidian geometrical demonstrations and include them in the 
Aristotelian framework.48 
Another objection to Albert’s position pertains to the issue whether the visible 
object is apprehended whole at once, or one part after another (and hence in time). The 
former option is challenged by the example of a coin on a floor (presented above).49 The 
way Albert deals with this objection also reveals his opinion regarding the temporal and 
spatial aspects of the visual process. I consider, first, his criticism of Euclid’s position, and 
second, his explanation of the example with the coin. 
In Albert’s reading, Euclid’s theory is based on the conviction that what is seen 
at one moment is only one point of the surface of the object – the very point touched by 
the axis of the visual cone. The vision of the whole object is completed because the axis 
runs over all the points of the object.50 However, this “scanning” of the object is so quick 
that it only takes a portion of time which is insensible to the perceiver. Therefore, the 
entire object is seen as if it were apprehended whole at once.51 
However, Albert holds that such a view implies an implausible account of vision. 
All the visual acts would be only illusory – every time an object is seen in its entirety, the 
sight would be deceived and the visual representation of the object would be only 
something fabricated by the perceiver from the infinite partial visions.52 In such a case, 
the whole would never be seen – the ray would not be able to run over all the points and 
grasp the visible object in its entirety.53 
 
47 De homine, 189a. 
48 Ibid., 198b. See also ibid., 201a and De sensu I.8, 39a; I.14, 52b. Such a reinterpretation was popular 
among the proponents of intromission – one may find it in Avicenna or Alhacen (Lindberg, Theories of 
Vision, pp. 49-50; 71-74); before Albert also in Blund, Tractatus de anima IX.93, 50. 
49 De homine, 188a. Albert also ponders the problem in detail later in his De sensu III. 
50 De sensu, III.4, 106a. 
51 De sensu, III.7, 110b-111a. 
52 De sensu, III.4, 105b. 
53 De sensu, III.4, 106b-107a; III.7, 111a. 
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Albert, on the contrary, is committed to the Aristotelian view that vision is 
instantaneous (since the change caused by the colour actualized by light is not a local 
motion but an alteration),54 the visual power is always altered by one visible object at a 
time,55 and hence the entire object is seen at once.56 
However, the example of the coin on the floor, tailored to Euclidian needs, still 
calls for an explanation in the Aristotelian framework. Apparently, the only way for Albert 
is to compromise his Aristotelian tenets a little. He distinguishes between two aspects of 
the visual process: apprehending the form impressed in the eye (virtus visiva … 
apprehendit formam impressam in oculo) and “directing” the form to the thing 
apprehended or focusing on the thing (dirigit formam illam ad rem, quam apprehendit 
per ipsam). Whereas the first phase of the visual process accords with the Aristotelian 
understanding of vision as passive and receptive, the second phase includes a kind of 
activity on the part of the visual power. Applied to the example, once the form of the floor 
is impressed in the eye, the visual power can “direct” (dirigit) the form to the floor in 
order to apprehend it – either to the whole floor, or only to a part of it. In the latter case, 
it apprehends one part of the floor after another and sees the coin as soon as it encounters 
it.57 
Hence, Albert is willing to introduce a role for attention in his Aristotelian 
account of vision. The attention is not a presupposition of the vision; it is rather a 
mechanism for ordering the impressions already received. Surprisingly, the impressions 
are not understood here as causal vehicles providing the vision, but rather as 
representations by virtue of which the perceiver apprehends the external things. 




54 De homine, 180b; 187a. 
55 De homine, 176b. 
56 De sensu, III.4, 106b; III.7, 111b. 
57 De homine, 189a-b. 
58 For other representationalist implications arguably present in Albert’s visual theory see L. Lička, “What 
is in the Mirror? The Metaphysics of Mirror Images in Albert the Great and Peter Auriol,” in B. Glenney and 
J. F. Silva (eds), The Senses and the History of Philosophy, London, Routledge, 2019, pp. 136-137. 
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3. Syncretism: Roger Bacon 
Another attitude to the extramissionist theory is a less dismissive one. Such an attitude 
may be found in the works of Roger Bacon and other perspectivists. Bacon developed his 
theory of vision in his early De sensu59 and especially in his mature works based on the 
optical tradition – De multiplicatione specierum and Perspectiva (both written in the 
1260s).60 Later, Bacon included the latter work as Part V in his Opus maius and also 
summarized its contents in Opus tertium.61 
At the time of Bacon’s life the Latin scholarship witnessed a vast -dissemination 
and assimilation of Alhacen’s De aspectibus and its intromissionist account of vision – a 
movement of which Bacon himself was a cutting-edge initiator.62 At first sight, Bacon’s 
 
59 While attributing De sensu to Bacon is not based on firm evidence, there are no decisive arguments 
against Bacon’s authorship. Although S. Donati, “Pseudoepigrapha in the Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri 
Baconi? The Commentaries on the Physics and on the Metaphysics,” in J. Verger and O. Weijers (eds), Les 
débuts de l’enseignement universitaire à Paris (1200-1245 environ), Turnhout, Brepols, 2013, recently 
convincingly contested the authenticity of some of Bacon’s early Aristotelian commentaries, it does not 
concern the case of De sensu (see ibid., 156). The arguments for attributing it to Bacon are gathered in S. C. 
Easton, Roger Bacon and his Search for a Universal Science, New York, Russell & Russell, 1952, pp. 232-235 
who inclines (with some hesitation) to a preliminary ascription of the work to Bacon. Since the work bears 
profound doctrinal similarities to Bacon’s mature works, I treat it here as authentic. See also Y. Raizman-
Kedar, “Questioning Aristotle: Roger Bacon on the True Essence of Colour,” The Journal of Medieval Latin, 
vol. 17, 2007, pp. 372-383 on the colour theory presented in this work. For the dating of De sensu see note 
62 below. 
60 For Bacon’s intellectual biography see Easton, Roger Bacon and the more recent A. Power, Roger Bacon 
and the Defence of Christendom, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013; cf. also an up-to-date 
chronology by J. Hackett, “From Sapientes antiqui at Lincoln to the New Sapientes moderni at Paris c. 1260–
1280: Roger Bacon’s Two Circles of Scholars,” in J. P. Cunningham and M. Hocknull (eds), Robert 
Grosseteste and the Pursuit of Religious and Scientific Learning in the Middle Ages, Dordrecht, Springer 
International Publishing, 2016. On Bacon’s visual theory see H. Hoffmans, “La genèse des sensations d'après 
Roger Bacon,” Revue néo-scolastique, vol. 15, 1908, pp. 474-498; Lindberg, Theories of Vision, 107-116; 
Lindberg, Roger Bacon, lxviii-lxxxvii; P. K. Loose, Roger Bacon on Perception: A Reconstruction and Critical 
Analysis of the Theory of Visual Perception Expounded in the Opus Majus, PhD Dissertation, Ohio State 
University, 1979, pp. 179-282; Y. Raizman-Kedar, Species as Signs: Roger Bacon (1220–1292) on 
Perspectiva and Grammatica, PhD Dissertation, University of Haifa, 2009, pp. 69-101; Smith, From Sight to 
Light, pp. 260-271; cf. also K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology 
and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250 – 1345, Leiden, Brill, 1988, ch. 1. 
61 Roger Bacon, Opus tertium, Un fragment inédit de l‘Opus tertium de Roger Bacon, P. Duhem (ed), 
Florence, Quaracchi, 1909, (hereafter OT(Duhem)), pp. 75-97. 
62 The earliest references to Alhacen in the context of psychological literature (known to me) are made by 
Adam Buckfield in his De sensu commentary (late 1230s) and the so-called Oxford gloss on De sensu 
influenced by him (see G. Galle, “Edition and Discussion of the Oxford Gloss on De sensu 1,” Archives 
d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-âge, vol. 75, 2008, pp. 211; 271-272); there are also several 
excerpts made by Bartholomeus Anglicus in early 1240s (see his DPR III.17, 62-64 and Lindberg, Theories 
of Vision, p. 253). Note also Richard Fishacre referring to Alhacen in his Questio de luce written in Oxford 
between 1245 and 1248 (see J. R. Long and T. B. Noone, “Fishacre and Rufus on the Metaphysics of Light: 
17 
 
own account of vision seems to have been heavily influenced by Alhacen. After a careful 
exposition of the anatomy and physiology of the eyes and the psychology of the internal 
senses in the opening distinctions of his Perspectiva, Bacon introduces the mechanism of 
vision: the objects issue species in all directions and once the species are received in the 
eye, the object is seen. For vision, the species of colour and light are required, which is 
proved by Alhacenian arguments: when exposed to intensive colour or light, the observer 
experiences afterimages or even pain.63 The species are not forms of the whole object (as 
in Aristotle or Albert), but rather forms emitted from every point of the surface of the 
object in all directions along direct lines. In the eye, only the relevant forms are selected 
– the ones entering the eye along the lines perpendicular to its surface – and a veridical 
representation of the object is reconstructed. These lines of propagation of the 
intromitted species constitute a visual cone – a notion enabling the use of geometry for 
explaining vision.64 
However, Bacon’s account should not be labelled “intromissionist” too hastily. 
Bacon is not a blind imitator of Alhacen – after all, in his own words, although Alhacen is 
used by some wise Latins, his compendium is nothing other than an exposition of 
Ptolemy’s Optics, which is in turn “the true source of the optical science”. Further, Bacon 
 
Two Unedited Texts,” in J. Hamesse (ed), Roma, magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis, Turhnout, 
Brepols, 1998, pp. 520, 532). Nevertheless, a full-fledged assimilation of Alhacen is to be situated not earlier 
than to the early 1260s – putting Bacon’s Perspectiva aside, Alhacen is often advocated by the Oxford 
master Geoffrey of Aspall in his De sensu commentary – see e.g. Galfridus de Aspale, Quaestiones super 
librum de sensu et sensato, MS Todi, Biblioteca Comunale 23, q. 35, fol. 108r; q. 69, ff. 117r-v. (On this work, 
see S. Ebbesen, Ch. T. Thörnqvist and V. Decaix, “Questions on De sensu et sensato, De memoria and De 
somno et vigilia. A Catalogue,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, vol. 57, 2015, pp. 66-70; I am indebted to 
S. Ebbesen for sharing with me some images of the Todi manuscript and some portions of his preliminary 
transcription of the work.) Note that all the references are in works written in Oxford (or – in the case of 
Bartholomaeus – by an Englishman), which is consonant with Bacon’s claim, made in the 1260s that 
perspectiva had not been taught in Paris so far and only twice in Oxford (Roger Bacon, Opus tertium, in Fr. 
Rogeri Bacon Opera quaedam hactenus inedita, J. S. Brewer (ed), London, 1859, 11, 37) and suggests that 
Bacon received training in this science in Oxford, probably in the early 1250s (see Hackett, “From Sapientes 
antiqui”, p. 125) and under the influence of Grosseteste’s writings. Furthermore, with respect to numerous 
references to Alhacen in Bacon’s De sensu, the work should be dated as being written after that training in 
the (early) 1250s – rather than in the 1240s, as Easton, Roger Bacon, pp. 59-61; 232-235 suggests. 
63 Persp. I.5.1, 60-62. For the argument from pain, see also Roger Bacon, Liber de sensu et sensato, R. Steele 
(ed), Opera hactenus inedita XIV, Oxford, Clarendon, 1937, (hereafter De sensu), 1, 3. 
64 Persp. I.6.1-2, 68-78. 
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stresses that he has also borrowed from another extramissionist authors, such as Euclid, 
Tideus, or Al-Kindí.65 
Hence, one need not be surprised when later in part I of the Perspectiva one 
encounters an explicit defence of extramission. Bacon points out that extramission was 
proposed by many respectable authorities – optical scientists, Christian saints such as 
Augustine, and even (allegedly) Aristotle.66 Further, authors such as Avicenna, Averroes 
and Alhacen who are famous for their criticism of extramissionist theories, should be 
read as arguing only against a robust version of extramission – against the postulation of 
a body issuing forth from the eyes that would seize the species of the object and bring it 
back to the eye.67 
Against such an exaggerated stress on the primacy of extramission, Bacon takes 
a modest position of syncretism with a primacy of intromission. According to this view, 
approved also by “experts in Aristotle’s philosophy and perspectiva”, vision consists in 
both receiving the species of the object in the eye and in propagating something from the 
eye.68 In contrast to its many earlier proponents, Bacon presents a different 
understanding of the extramission postulate. What is emitted from the eyes is not a body 
of a subtle nature, but a species of the eye or of the sight (species oculi or visus). Such a 
postulate can be easily justified in the context of his philosophy: if every entity in the 
universe is constantly multiplying its species in the surrounding medium, that is also 
what the sensory organs should do. And just as the species of an object somehow 
resembles that object as its source, the species of the sense of sight somehow resembles 
the sight and participates in the nature of the visual power to some extent.69 
Hence, Bacon proposes a syncretic account of vision, in which intromission has a 
primary role. The emission is not responsible for the multiplication of the species of the 
objects; they are propagated independently of the observer. The cognitive contact 
between perceiver and object is established by the causal influence of the latter on the 
 
65 OT (Duhem), 75-76; cf. also Persp. I.7.2, 100; Persp., app. 1, 336; and Roger Bacon, De multiplicatione 
specierum, Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature, D. C. Lindberg (ed and trans.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1983, (hereafter DMS), pp. 347. The differences between Alhacen and Bacon are summarized by Smith, 
From Sight to Light, p. 271. 
66 Persp. I.7.2, 100. 
67 Persp. I.7.3, 102. 
68Persp. I.7.3, 104. 
69 Persp. I.7.2, 100; DMS I.2, 30-32. 
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former. But Bacon evidently wants to preserve extramission as well. In this strategy, his 
sources may be Robert Grosseteste or Bartholomeus Anglicus.70 But does extramission 
have any role in the visual process, or is its presence in Bacon’s theory a residue of an 
inorganic harmonization of different sources (as seems to be the case in Bartholomeus)? 
Scholars have taken various strategies in answering this question. Some 
emphasize the intromissionist framework of Bacon’s account and infer that Bacon’s 
references to extramission are nothing more than ad hoc additions incoherent with the 
rest of his theory, or an unimportant relic of earlier authors, included by Bacon due to his 
efforts to harmonize all the available sources.71 Postulating the species of the eye would 
thus be merely a Bacon’s way of paying homage to authors such as Ptolemy, but would 
not have any significant role in his theory.72 
However, Bacon’s references to extramission are systematic, not merely 
occasional. A strong affirmation of extramission is found in the Opus tertium – Bacon 
asserts that although the intromissionist account is so “deeply rooted in the hearts of the 
common scholars that they do not want to hear anything contrary”, extramission is the 
truest (veracissimum) position.73 The work was intended as a brief summary of 
everything important in the Opus maius – would Bacon put so much stress on 
extramission here, if it was just an ad hoc addition to his theory? Besides that, there are 
numerous places in his optical works where extramission is taken for granted or argued 
for.74 
 
70 See note 15 above. Bacon’s acquaintance with Grosseteste’s works is evident (see e.g. D C. Lindberg, 
Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. xviii-xx; xlix-lvi and Bacon’s 
eulogies of Grosseteste, e.g. in Compendium studii philosophiae, in J. S. Brewer (ed), Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera 
quaedam hactenus inedita, London, 1859, 8, 469); Bartholomeus’s encyclopaedia was known in Oxford in 
the late 1240s (see Long, Noone, “Fishacre and Rufus,” p. 519) and Bacon refers to it in a passage on magnet 
in his Opus minus, Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera quaedam hactenus inedita, J. S. Brewer (ed), London, 1859, p. 
384. 
71 Bacon himself stresses that, when writing on perspectiva, he does not want to imitate just one author, 
but chooses the best parts of every account – OT (Duhem), 75. 
72 Lindberg, Theories of Vision, pp. 114–116; G. B. Matthews, “A Medieval Theory of Vision,” in P. K. 
Machamer and R. G. Turnbull (eds), Studies in Perception: Interrelations in the History of Philosophy and 
Science, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1978, p. 196; Raizman-Kedar, Species as Signs, pp. 91-92. 
Lindberg, Roger Bacon, pp. lxxxiii–lxxxvi suggest that it may also be a result of the fact that Bacon wrote his 
works “in haste, or in multiple drafts” and left them unrevised. 
73 OT (Duhem), 78-79. 
74 See DMS I.2, 30-32; I.5, 74; Persp. I.7.2-4, 100-106; II.1.1, 160-162; II.1.3, 174-176; II.2.1, 176-178; III.1.2, 
260-262. The species visus is also employed in DMS II.5, 128; II.10, 176; Persp. I.9.1, 126. Loose, Roger 
Bacon on Perception, pp. 205-207, argues that the first two thirds of Perspectiva I present a preliminary 
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Recently, some scholars have also proposed that Bacon’s syncretism may have 
been motivated by theological concerns. Bacon states that the eye, which not only 
receives the species but also actively cooperates, may serve as a model for spiritual vision, 
which requires not only the reception of divine grace, but also the cooperation of the 
recipient’s soul and free will.75 However, I believe that Bacon also had purely 
philosophical reasons to endorse extramission, which are internal to his visual theory.76 
In my opinion, extramission is not a source of confusion in Bacon’s theory, but on the 
contrary perfectly coherent with Bacon’s account. What does Bacon himself say about the 
role of the species of the eye in the visual process? He asserts that the species of an 
inanimate object are ontologically inferior to the eye (as a part of an animated body) and 
are not suited to act upon the eye just on their own account (non sunt nate statim de se 
agere plenam actionem in visum propter eius nobilitatem); therefore, they must be 
refined in some way. The species of the eye are emitted in the medium, alter and ennoble 
it and make it commensurate to the visual power. As a consequence, the entrance of the 
species of the object is prepared, because the visual power emitted in the medium 
ennobles the species of the object and renders them commensurate to the eye (eam 
nobilitat, ut omnino sit conformis et proportionalis nobilitati corporis animati, quod est 
oculus) and consequently able to act upon it.77 
It is obvious from this passage that extramission (of the sensory power) is 
Bacon’s answer to the issue of the ontological gap between the material world and the 
cognizer. The conviction that sensory organs are ontologically superior and more noble 
 
intromissionist account of the visual process, which is later in part I and especially in part II specified and 
modified by the extramission postulate. 
75 Persp. III.3.1, 324; the passage was pointed out by Loose, Roger Bacon on Perception, pp. 271-272 and 
Raizman-Kedar, Species as Signs, p. 90; the theological interpretation is embraced by J. Hackett, “Roger 
Bacon and the Moralization of Science: From Perspectiva through Scientia Experimentalis to Moralis 
Philosophia,” I francescani e le scienze, Spoleto, Centro Italiano di Studi sull’Alto Medioevo, 2012, pp. 384-
385; idem, “From Sapientes antiqui”, pp. 133-134. 
76 The active component of Bacon’s visual theory was stressed already by Hoffmans, “La genèse des 
sensations”, pp. 479-486, but only in order to reprehend the theory for an implicit tendency to subjectivism. 
A rare acknowledgement of Bacon’s syncretism may be found in Loose, Roger Bacon on Perception, 
especially pp. 205-225, 244-253. 
77 Persp. I.7.4, 104; also I.8.1, 108-110. Another way the sensory power acts on the received species is that 
it forces it to abandon the “laws of nature” and the rectilinear path of multiplication. Once in the animated 
medium, especially in the nerves, the species is not propagated along a direct line anymore but along a 
“twisted line” (linea tortuosa) – see DMS II.2, 102; idem, The Opus maius of Roger Bacon, 3 vols., J. H. 
Bridges (ed), Oxford – Edinburgh, 1897–1900, IV.2.2, 117; OT (Duhem), 78. 
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than material things is asserted already in his De sensu. There Bacon expounds the 
Aristotelian statement that organs are receptive of a certain kind of qualities, because 
their nature is constituted by the middle between the extremes of these qualities.78 Bacon 
explains that it should not be taken that, e.g., the eye is constituted from a colour in the 
middle of the scale between white and black, but that the elements of organs are elevated 
above the common status of inanimate objects and have the most noble being possible in 
nature. Such being is called “spiritual”, although not in a sense implying something 
incorporeal; they are highly refined and subtle, while still material.79 
Hence, there is a salient gap between the sensory organs and material objects. 
How can such a gap be bridged? It is worth noting that there is no mention of extramission 
in De sensu.80 It seems that when Bacon was writing this work, he was still advocating an 
Aristotelian theory of abstraction. According to this traditional Aristotelian explanation 
of how the species of a material object can enter the soul’s power, the species of the object 
can act upon the senses because they are refined already in the medium and they undergo 
a continuing abstraction. Indeed, early Bacon remarks several times that the species are 
endowed with spiritual being in the medium and in the organ.81 
But later in the 1260s, he abandoned the notion of the species having spiritual 
being in the medium.82 He asserts that it is foolish to deny the material nature of the 
species. They obtain their existence from their causes and since these causes (i.e., the 
things that generate the species on the one hand and the matter from whose potency the 
species are educed on the other) are material, the species are material as well.83 
 
78 Aristotle, De anima II.11, 424a4-5; Averroes, De an. II.118, 313-314. 
79 De sensu 1, 4. Bacon ascribed such an elevation to the powers of the soul and the heavens. 
80 Species of the eye are mentioned in De sensu 1, 10-11, but no role in the completion of the visual act is 
attributed to them. Vision occurs when the sight receives the form of the seen objects and renders them to 
the ultimate sentient seated at the intersection of the optical nerves – De sensu 3, 7-8. (The same assertion 
is also in Persp. I.5.2, 62-64; however, as we have seen, later it is problematized how exactly the forms are 
received in the sense.) 
81 De sensu 8, 28; 23, 117-118; 24, 124-125. Such a claim is perhaps influenced by Grosseteste – see Robert 
Grosseteste, De lineis angulis et figuris, Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von 
Lincoln, L. Baur (ed), Münster, Aschendorff, 1912, p. 60. 
82 And apparently also the whole notion of abstraction, as argued by Y. Raizman-Kedar, “The Intellect 
Naturalized: Roger Bacon on the Existence of Corporeal Species within the Intellect,” Early science and 
medicine, vol. 14, no. 1, 2009, pp. 140-145. 
83 DMS III.2, 190. Note that materiality does not imply corporeality here – the species are material but they 
are not bodies sui generis – see DMS III.1, 178-186. For an interpretation of Bacon stressing that the sensory 
organs are not only affected materially by species but also actually coloured by them, see M. Mantovani, 
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Consequently, Bacon needs another mechanism for bridging the ontological gap. It seems 
that extramission of the visual power (or “species visus”) can serve as such a mechanism 
in the case of vision. Hence, Bacon’s concession to extramission is not cognitive, but 
metaphysical: it is proposed in order to deal with the problem of ascendant causality and 
the need of species of material objects for refinement.84 Bacon seems to endorse the 
position that species are ennobled by the soul’s power proceeding towards them – a 
position refuted in Albert’s De anima – which can perhaps be understood as an early 
anticipation of the later notion of sensus agens.85 
In Bacon’s middle account between intromission and extramission, what is his 
stance regarding temporal and spatial aspects of vision? Does he prefer an Aristotelian 
solution or a Euclidian one? Following Alhacen’s lead, he dismisses the Aristotelian 
position, advocates the Euclidian one and gives a reasonable solution to the objections to 
it that had earlier been raised by Albert. 
First, Bacon doubts even the basic Aristotelian claim that alteration occurs 
immediately – the very multiplication of species takes a moment, albeit an imperceptible 
one for the observer’s sensory powers. Hence, it appears to him as if the light were 
propagated in no time.86 Consequently, sensation also takes place in time.87 However, the 
time necessary for completing the visual act is sometimes even perceptible to the 
 
“Visio per sillogismum: Sensation and Cognition in 13th-Century Theories of Vision,” in E. Băltuță (ed), 
Medieval Perceptual Puzzles. Theories of Perception in the 13th and 14th Centuries, Leiden, Brill, 2020, pp. 
117–129. 
84 Cf. also Loose, Roger Bacon on Perception, pp. 249-250 who mentions a “vertical causality” and 
Augustinian influences on Bacon’s theory of vision. Another corroboration for such interpretation of 
Bacon’s visual theory may be that it accords with the way some later medieval thinkers understood him. In 
anonymous questions on optics I found in a 14th-century Prague manuscript, Bacon is listed among 
proponents of extramission along with Euclid and Ptolemy and his metaphysical justification of 
extramission from Persp. I.7 is analysed there – see Anonymus, Quaestiones de perspectiva, MS Praha, 
Knihovna metropolitní kapituly M.100, ff. 69rb, 69va-b. I am preparing an edition of the treatise. 
85 The understanding of sensus agens as a kind of extramission is mentioned (and refuted) by John of 
Jandun, Questio de sensu agente, A. Pattin (ed), Pour l’histoire du sens agent: la controverse entre 
Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun ses antécédents et son evolution, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 
1988, p. 225. The activity of the sensory power is connected with extramission also in Anonymus, Lectura 
II.14.1, 323-324. 
86 De sensu 23, 114-118; DMS IV.3, 220-226; Persp. I.9.3-4, 134-144 (note that he explicitly associates the 
multiplication in time also with the species visus); OT (Duhem), 81. See also Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 
pp. 20-21. 
87 De sensu 23, 120-121. 
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observer – Bacon explains this experience by highlighting that the visual act includes not 
only a reception of the multiplied species but also a visual “judgement”.88 
This “judgment”, which takes time to be made, is a certification of the vision 
performed by the movement of the axis of the visual cone travelling over the object. Bacon 
advocates the Euclidian view that there is a different sensitivity in different regions of the 
base of the visual cone.89 However, it should not be understood in the way criticized by 
Albert, as if some parts of the base were seen and others completely unseen. Euclid’s 
proposition that nothing is seen whole at once should be understood – according to Bacon 
– with regard to different grades of certainty: the central parts are seen clearly and with 
certainty and the peripheral ones are unclear and confused.90 Unlike Aristotelians (and 
Euclid in Albert’s reading), Bacon advocates the view that we see a number of things at 
once – but only one thing (or a part of it) is seen with certainty. The vision is completed 
by the passing of the visual axis (which follows the movements of the eye), by means of 
which the parts of the thing are certified successively, one after another.91 
Hence, vision is not a state of being affected, but rather a process in which visual 
acuity is accomplished by an active scanning of the visual field. A number of things are 
seen at once, but with a different grade of certainty. 
 
4. Reinterpretation: Peter Olivi 
Finally, there is a strategy developed by Peter Olivi in some of his questions (written in 
the late 1270s and early 1280s) later included in his Summa.92 His attitude towards 
 
88 Persp. I.9.4, 144. “Time” is also included among the conditions of (veridical) vision – an object must not 
move too quickly in order to be seen properly – Persp. I.9.2, 132; OT (Duhem), p. 81. 
89 Note that according to Bacon, there are two visual cones: one constituted by the species propagating from 
the object and the other consisting of the species of the sight. However, these two cones are identical 
regarding their location – Persp. I.7.4, 106; II.2.1, 178. 
90 Persp. I.7.4, 106; II.2.1, 178; also I.6.2, 78. 
91 Persp. II.2.1, 178; also I.7.4, 106. 
92 On Olivi’s visual theory, see e.g. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pp. 39–54; R. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition 
in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 130-134; 168-181; J. F. Silva 
and J. Toivanen, “The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi,” 
Vivarium, vol 48, no. 3, 2010, pp. 260-277; H. T. Adriaenssen, “Peter John Olivi on Perceptual 
Representation,” Vivarium, vol. 49, no. 4, 2011, pp. 324-352; J. Toivanen, Perception and the Internal 
Senses: Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul, Leiden, Brill, 2013, pp. 115-222; 
and M. E. Kalderon, Sympathy in Perception, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, ch. 5. Olivi’s 
interest in the optical issues was uncovered by Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pp. 40-49 and recently 
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extramission is an instance of the way he deals with philosophical theories generally – 
ignoring what is and what is not conceived as plausible by his contemporaries, he often 
devotes a careful investigation to every theory and uncovers its (often unspoken) 
foundations and merits, while being determined not to be too dogmatic in philosophical 
matters.93 
Although optics and theory of vision witnessed an increasing prevalence of 
Alhacenian intromission in the 1270s and 1280s (John Peckham and Witelo were 
composing their works on optics at that time), Peter Olivi does not hesitate to doubt the 
“Alhacenian turn” and reproaches those who identify a book by “one Saracen” with the 
whole of optical science for idolatry. Besides, Olivi notes, indicating his own efforts, that 
what is explained by “rays coming from things” can be reframed using “virtual rays of the 
sight itself” – just as Augustine and many others used “corporeal rays of the eye” for the 
same purpose.94 Olivi’s optical project in its totality cannot be introduced here, thus the 
focus will be on some aspects of his visual theory in relation to his rethinking of 
extramission. 
Before his visual theory can be outlined, two basic tenets of Olivi’s anthropology 
important for his philosophy of perception need to be recalled. The first one is dualism: 
the sphere of material objects and the sphere of spiritual souls are radically different. 
Whereas material objects are extended and inanimate, spiritual souls are unextended and 
endowed with life and consciousness. Thus, the issue of the ontological gap is of special 
importance to Olivi. The second tenet is the activity of the soul in its operations: the soul 
(or its power) is always the first active principle of its operations; otherwise the 
operations would be necessitated by something external and, as a result, the soul would 
 
partially investigated by D. Demange, “Olivi et les Perspectivi,” Oliviana, vol. 5, 2016, 
http://oliviana.revues.org/850 and L. Lička, “Attention, Perceptual Content, and Mirrors: Two Medieval 
Models of Active Perception in Peter Olivi and Peter Auriol,” Filosofický časopis, vol. 65, Special Issue 2, 
2017, pp. 103–110, but a complete account is still missing. The dating of Olivi’s questions is borrowed from 
a preliminary chronology of Olivi’s works by S. Piron (to whom I express my gratitude for sharing it) – see 
also S. Piron, “La chronologie des écrits d’Olivi,” Oliviana, vol. 6 (forthcoming). 
93 For Olivi’s “sceptical” approach to philosophical theories see the classical D. Burr, “Peter John Olivi and 
the Philosophers,” Franciscan Studies, vol. 31, 1971, especially pp. 69-70. 
94 Summa II.58, 499. 
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be passive and not free. Both tenets also presuppose that the soul and its powers are 
noble and superior to material objects.95 
The early Olivi perhaps hesitated concerning the intromissionist theory of 
species96 and later he mentions having taught the common opinion regarding the species 
in schools, or presenting various opinions while asserting none of them.97 However, the 
two tenets outlined above make it impossible for Olivi to accept the intromissionist 
account of vision. If vision occurred by the received species, the visual power would not 
be free but subjected to the objects whose affections it suffers. Further, it is not clear how 
the species of a material and extended object could even enter the sensory power of the 
spiritual soul.98 
The extramissionist theory seems to be more suitable for Olivi’s demands. In q. 
58 (ca. 1277-1278), where he argues for activity of the sensory powers in a digression 
included in a more extensive reasoning for activity of the will, he presents a set of 
counter-arguments based on the tacit assumption that activity of perception implies 
extramission.99 He rejects such an assumption and criticizes the emission theory of 
Augustine, but gradually develops a theory based on some of the less problematic 
features of Augustine’s theory. Later in q. 73 (ca. 1281-1282) focused on extramission, 
Olivi presents and criticizes the traditional materialistic notion of extramission in a 
syncretic account with a primacy of extramission, which he ascribes to some Platonists 
and Augustine, and elaborates his own theory of aspectus modelled as a “virtual ray”.100 
 
95 Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, pp. 176–181; Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses, pp. 25–42; J. 
F. Silva, “Medieval Theories of Active Perception: An Overview,” in J. F. Silva and M. Yrjönsuuri (eds), Active 
Perception in the History of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 2014, pp. 
132–135. 
96 See Summa II.26, 454-455 (before 1275) where it is taken for granted that vision occurs by means of 
receiving the species (note that the passage is preserved in only one manuscript). 
97 Petrus Iohannis Olivi, “Tria scripta sui ipsius apologetica annorum 1283 et 1285,” D. Laberge (ed), 
Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, vol. 28, 1935, pp. 128; 404-405. 
98 For a detailed account of Olivi’s criticism of the theory of species see e.g. Toivanen, Perception and the 
Internal Senses, pp. 125-135. 
99 Summa II.58, 405-407 (counter-arguments) and 486-499 (Olivi’s response to them). This kind of 
assumption seems to have been common among his contemporaries (see the anonymous Lectura as in note 
85), but, of course, not the sole understanding of the activity of perception (for the others, see Silva, 
“Medieval Theories of Active Perception”). 
100 Summa II.73, 52-106. As it argued in Lička, “Attention, Perceptual Content, and Mirrors”, pp. 105–106, 
the Platonici Olivi criticized are possibly the 12th century proponents of syncretic accounts with a primacy 
of extramission, such as William of Conches. The role of a Platonic emission theory in developing Olivi’s 
own view was implied already by B. Jansen, Die Erkenntnislehre Olivis, Berlin, Dümmlers, 1921, p. 22 (in 
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Olivi’s arguments are targeted especially against the postulate of corporeal visual 
rays. Just as in the case of Albert the Great, Olivi’s arguments against extramission seem 
to have been at least partially influenced by Avicenna. If what is emitted were a corporeal 
body, it would have to travel extremely fast and reach the stars immediately. Further, the 
sense of touch would have to be somehow present in the corporeal visual ray – with the 
absurd consequence that we would feel all the changes of the medium, such as hot or cold 
air or winds, while seeing through it. Also, the changes in the ray and vision cannot be 
explained with reference to the will since we often see against our will. Finally, Olivi 
presents an Alhacenian argument against syncretism with a primacy of extramission: if 
the sole role of the emitted visual ray is to catch the species of the object and bring it back 
to the sight, then – in view of the fact that the species of the objects can propagate through 
the medium by themselves – the visual rays are superfluous.101 Thus, the extramission 
postulate is impossible and futile for explaining perception and, as Olivi points out, 
nobody actually upholds it today (nullus hodie sequitur).102 
However, there is a grain of truth in the extramissionist theories – the claim 
(ascribed by Olivi to Augustine) that the sensory powers “touch” (attingerent) their 
objects by a virtual aspectus and thus they are at their objects in a metaphorical way.103 
The notion of aspectus is at the very core of Olivi’s visual theory. In Olivi’s view, an 
aspectus is a constituent of every causal action, no matter whether physical or 
psychological, and manifests its orientation and directedness towards a target 
(terminus). For example, when throwing a stone, the thrower gives an aspectus to the 
stone, an inclination towards an aim. Similarly, when a perceiver is about to see, his sight 
has an aspectus to an object and it is oriented to it.104 
The first two tenets of extramissionist theories (the extramission postulate and 
the primacy of the sight) provide inspiration for Olivi’s visual theory. The extramissionist 
 
his summary of q. 73); later mentioned by Tachau, Vision and Certitude, p. 41; Pasnau, Theories of 
Cognition, pp. 169-170, Silva and Toivanen, “The Active Nature of the Soul,” pp. 272-275; Adriaenssen, 
“Peter John Olivi on Perceptual Representation,” pp. 329-330; and elaborated by Demange, “Olivi et les 
Perspectivi,” and Lička, “Attention, Perceptual Content, and Mirrors”. Olivi’s early thoughts on aspectus are 
present already in his Summa II.23, 424-432 (before 1275). 
101 Summa II.73, 59-61. 
102 Summa II.58, 482. 
103 Summa II.73, 62-63. 
104 Summa II.23, 424. 
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emphasis on the activity and primacy of the visual power in the visual process is 
consonant with his metaphysical principles. The visual process cannot be initiated by the 
effects of external objects received in the visual power – since the visual power is 
ontologically superior, objects cannot act upon it.105 Thus, the primary impulse for vision 
originates from the observer – Olivi identifies it with the aspectus, directedness or focus 
of the visual power. The visual aspectus is understood by him as attention – a 
psychological mechanism enabling the observer to scan the environment and actively 
grasp perceptual information.106 It is worth noting that Olivi’s notion of attention is 
completely different from the one proposed by Albert. Whereas for Albert attention is a 
secondary process of sorting impressions already received, in Olivi’s view it is a necessary 
preceding condition of every visual act.107 The primacy of paying attention is manifested 
by Olivi’s claims that aspectus is not necessarily always determined to a specific object.108 
Such an undetermined aspectus would occur even in an imaginary scenario where there 
would be no external object to be seen at all.109 
Olivi also exploits a hidden potential of extramissionist theory – the ability to 
assign a role in the visual process to eye movements, which cannot be explained in the 
intromissionist framework. According to Olivi, the eye is made round and capable of quick 
movements on purpose. If it were flat, it would not be able to look around from left to 
right, but would see only what is in front of it. The roundness of the eye thus contributes 
to the greater range of visual attention.110 The eye movements performed on the 
physiological level manifest attention shifting and focusing on the psychological level.111 
Besides the primacy of the visual activity, Olivi even holds a version of the 
extramission postulate – he describes the aspectus or attention focusing and shifting as a 
 
105 Summa II.72, 18–27. 
106 Interpretation of aspectus as attention is quite usual in the literature – see Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 
pp. 41-42; Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, pp. 130–134, 168–181; Toivanen, Perception and the Internal 
Senses, pp. 151–161. 
107 Summa II.72, 9. 
108 Summa II.36, 634. 
109 On Olivi’s thought experiment of a “man before creation”, see J. Toivanen, “The Fate of the Flying Man: 
Medieval Reception of Avicenna’s Thought Experiment,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, vol. 3, R. 
Pasnau (ed), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 86–94. 
110 Summa II.73, 95-96. 
111 Petrus Iohannis Olivi, Quodlibeta quinque, S. Defraia (ed), Grottaferrata, Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 
2002, I.4, 17: “[…] ad uarium motum oculi sequitur uarius aspectus in eius potentia uisiua […]”; see also 
Summa II.73, 105; II.111, 274. 
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kind of “virtual ray” (radius virtualis).112 Visual attention is modelled as a ray directed 
from the eye to the environment. Olivi’s description even implies a basic concept of the 
visual cone: there are imaginary straight lines directed from every point of the pupil to 
the whole hemisphere demarcating the scope of visual attention.113 These lines constitute 
a visual cone – the visual attention stretches forth in the form of a cone (aciem visivi 
aspectus … oportet pyramidaliter acui et protendi), with the apex in the centre of the eye 
and the base attached to the quantity of the visible object.114 Olivi’s description of the 
visual ray and cone reveals that his sources were rather Platonists than Euclidians.115 
Although he once mentions that the apparent size of the object is a function of the size of 
the angle in the apex of the visual cone,116 he proposes no geometrical demonstration and 
focuses more on the dynamic and oscillating nature of the visual ray – attention has an 
“effort” (conatus), a “tendency” (inclinatio) and an “onset” (impetus) and these dynamic 
features bring about attentional switching.117 The shifting of attention (variatio or 
mutatio aspectus) serves as a foundation for Olivi’s explanation of optical phenomena 
such as reflection or refraction.118 
The most important difference between Olivi’s theory of aspectus and the visual 
rays postulated by Augustine and Platonists is Olivi’s accentuation of virtual and spiritual 
nature of the rays of attention. He explicitly asserts his notion of aspectus is a version of 
Augustinian notion of a visual ray, although the latter is corporeal, whereas the former is 
“virtual”.119 Olivi also speaks about a “virtual extramission of the visual power” 
 
112 Summa II.58, 490: “[…] virtus visiva […] potest dici habere radium virtualem. Qui radius non est aliud 
quam ipse aspectus sic virtualiter protensus […].” 
113 Summa II.73, 65; also II.58, 490. 
114 Summa II.73, 96, also ibid., 91 and II.58, 497. 
115 Summa II.73, 55–61; on Olivi’s sources cf. Demange, “Olivi et les Perspectivi,” § 5-10 and Lička, 
“Attention, Perceptual Content, and Mirrors”, pp. 105–106. As far as I know he never mentions Euclid or 
another proponent of geometrical optics. Note that Demange suggests Al-Kindí as Olivi’s source; however, 
there is no direct evidence for such a claim. 
116 Summa II.73, 91. 
117 Summa II.58, 466, 490. 
118 See Summa II.58, 498-499; II.73, 69-71; 93 and Lička, “Attention, Perceptual Content, and Mirrors”, pp. 
108–110 (reflection and mirrors) and Summa II.23, 431-432; II.58, 490-3; II.73, 73-74; 92-93 (refraction). 
119 Summa II.58, 494; radii virtuales are mentioned also ibid., 490, 494 and 499. 
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(extramissio virtualis virtutis visivae).120 Nothing is actually emitted (no body, subtle 
matter, or even a species of the power) – the shifting of attention exists really (tamquam 
in subiecto) in the visual power and its organ.121 However, the dynamics of the visual 
power has an outward direction and can be metaphorically described as an emission 
towards the object.122 The virtual rays are merely imaginary representations of the paths 
of the attentional switching.123 Although there is no real emission of the power, no 
rarefaction or local motion through the medium to the object, the workings of attention 
are somehow proportionate and analogous to these real properties and can be described 
as a virtual stretching out, a movement and virtual contact with the object.124 Also, when 
attention “touches” the object and is fixed upon it, it is not a material contact but rather a 
stabilization and “quieting” of the dynamics of attention.125 
But the movement of aspectus or attentional shifting is not vision yet. Against the 
traditional visual ray theory, Olivi strictly demarcates two phases of the visual process: 
(1) the visual ray or attention and (2) the visual act itself. The movements of the virtual 
ray and its fixation upon an object precede the actual vision but are not identical with 
it.126 The (1) attention is an outwards-directed orientation and dynamic oscillation, while 
the (2) vision is something created in the visual power of the observer. Once the aspectus 
is fixed upon its object which is “sucked” (imbibitum) into the aspectus, the visual power 
 
120 Summa II.58, 488. Note that interpreting the visual rays as spiritual entities was also proposed as a way 
of preserving the postulate against its criticism by pseudo-Grosseteste, Summa philosophiae XII.18, 507-
508. 
121 Summa II.73, 66. 
122 On the nature of the virtual aspectus see also Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, pp. 172-175. 
123 Summa II.73, 67. 
124Summa II.73, 104. 
125 Summa II.73, 105. 
126 Hence, I do not think that the problem implied in D. Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 
Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 2004, pp. 136-137, and conceptualized in Adriaenssen, “Peter John Olivi 
on Perceptual Representation,” pp. 331-332  exists: viz., that in order for attention to be fixed upon x, x 
must already be cognized in a preliminary way; but the cognition of x presupposes a determination of 
attention to x and, hence, an infinite regress occurs. On the contrary, in the first moment, the observer just 
opens his eyes, directs an undetermined aspectus outwards and scans the environment, waiting for what 
will be offered to his aspectus. When an object occurs, the aspectus is fixed upon it (the virtual ray “touches” 
the object, which is in the middle of the base of the visual cone) and the second phase of the visual process 
begins when the visual act is created. For the difference between the undetermined and determined 
aspectus see Silva and Toivanen, “The Active Nature of the Soul,” pp. 275-277; Toivanen, Perception and 




efficiently causes its own visual act, which is in turn “conformed and configured” to the 
object (conformatur et configuratur obiecto).127 
Hence, there are two kinds of contact here. The (1) “attentional” contact is 
outwards-directed and presents a quasi-extramissionist way of reaching out to the visible 
object. But the visual cognition itself does not occur until the (2) cognitive contact is 
established, which is an inwards-directed determination of the content of the visual act 
performed by the object once the visual power has created the act.128 
It is important to note that – since Olivi takes the ontological gap between the 
object and the soul’s power seriously – both contacts are explained without advocating 
any kind of physical realization or receiving a real entity. As for part (1) of the visual 
process, having attention fixed upon an object does not mean that the beholder touches 
it by means of a material extension of himself, but merely that the dynamic efforts of his 
visual power come to a rest. What is the cause of such a quieting? Olivi stresses that the 
efficient cause of attentional switching is the cognitive power, or ultimately the will.129 
But the virtual ray of attention must also somehow be affected by the external things. 
Thus, Olivi introduces a second kind of causation cooperating with the efficient cause – 
“terminative” or “objective” causality.130 For example, when attention “bounces back” 
upon encountering a mirror, the efficient cause of such a change of direction is supposed 
to be the power and the mirror plays the role of a terminative cause. Having the 
ontological gap in mind (the mirror is a material object and the ray of attention is a 
spiritual extension of the soul’s power), Olivi stresses that the action exerted by the 
mirror is not a full-fledged ontologically committing efficient causation.131 Similarly, 
establishing a (2) cognitive contact between the object seen and the visual act is also not 
described as an efficient causal influence exerted by the object upon the visual power, but 
again as merely “terminative causality”.132 
 
127 Summa II.72, 35-36. 
128 Summa II.72, 38-39; see also Adriaenssen, “Peter John Olivi on Perceptual Representation,” pp. 339-346 
who distinguished between the object as a terminus of the aspectus and as a terminus of the act. 
129 Summa II.73, 66; 68; 74. 
130 On this notion in Olivi see Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, pp. 119–121; Adriaenssen, “Peter John Olivi on 
Perceptual Representation,” pp. 339-346; Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses, pp. 145–150. 
131 Summa II.73, 68; see also ibid., 66; 89; 103-104. 
132 Recently, the problem of whether the determination of the act by the object is to be interpreted in an 
externalist way (as a special kind of causality of the object) or in an internalist way (as a special kind of 
“configuration” the power performs itself) was raised by Adriaenssen, “Peter John Olivi on Perceptual 
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Hence, Olivi’s account appears to be a rethinking of the Platonist conception of 
extramission, or rather a syncretic account with a primacy of extramission. He 
reinterprets the postulate of a physical extramission in a psychological way as attentional 
switching and fixation, described as a virtual ray. He reinterprets the “backwards motion” 
of grasping the form of the object and announcing it to the visual power as establishing 
cognitive contact, where the visual power efficiently causes the visual act and the object 
terminatively causes its content. 
Finally, the distinction between the two phases of the visual process gives Olivi a 
good position to deal with the issue of whether vision is immediate or successive. 
Generally speaking, Olivi seems to be just as suspicious of the successive account of vision 
as Albert was. If we apprehended just one part of the visible object at one moment, we 
would never reach a determinate and certain apprehension of the whole thing. Hence, 
apprehension must be immediate (in instanti).133 If vision is immediate, do we apprehend 
just one thing or a number of things in one moment? Olivi ponders the question and he 
presents an argument for the latter solution: if what is seen were solely the place to which 
the axis of the visual cone is attached, the perceiver would see just one point. However, 
such a conclusion is implausible: either he sees nothing, or he sees a divisible continuum 
that has a quantity and hence a plurality of parts.134 Later he specifies his position: 
 
Representation,” who favours the latter option against the traditional externalist interpretation (e.g. 
Pasnau and Toivanen as quoted above). I tend to understand Olivi as proposing a special kind of causality 
here – one that is not ontologically committing (note that Olivi admits that terminative causality can be 
counted among the efficient causes in the broad sense – Summa II.72, 10). Thus, a comparison with the 
modern Lewisian interpretation of causality as a counterfactual dependence seems useful here. In this 
view, A causes B, if it holds that (1) if A occurs, B occurs, and (2) if A did not occur, B would not occur. (See 
D. Lewis, “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 58, 1980, 
pp. 239–249; W. Fish, Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction, New York – London, 
Routledge, 2010, pp. 113-118.) Applied to the Olivi’s case: the visual act is “caused” by the object in the 
sense that (1) if the object x occurs then the vision of x occurs and (2) if the object x did not occur, then the 
vision of x would not occur. Note that Olivi’s makes a similar explanation in Summa II.72, 10: “[Vis activa] 
absque tali termino et terminatione non posse agere suum actum et posse hoc cum ipso […].” Hence, Olivi’s 
claim that the determination of the visual act is caused by the object, although not efficiently but 
terminatively should be understood as asserting that the visual act counterfactually depends on the object 
without receiving any actual entity from it (which would compromise the ontological superiority of the 
visual power). Further, Adriaenssen’s internalist reading of the “termination” fits only the second phase of 
the visual process (determination of the visual content). But Olivi uses the notion of termination also in the 
first phase (the attention switching and fixation), where the causal interpretation seems to be a better 
choice. 
133 Summa II.26, 452. 
134 Summa II.37, 660. 
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evidently, we see more than just one point, but on the other side, what is seen has to 
evince some kind of unity. The source of such a unity is the aspectus – hence, we see a 
number of things at once but always under one aspectus.135 
On the other hand, we often experience that we are performing a successive 
scanning of the environment. Is it against Olivi’s general conviction that vision is 
immediate? Not necessarily: he emphasises two phases of the visual process. The first 
(attention focusing) can be either immediate or successive (simul vel successive dirigitur 
aspectus ab oculo).136 The simple “propagation” of the aspectus is understood as 
immediate, since it is not a local motion that takes place in time.137 However, attention 
focusing can also be successive when it is applied to an excesively large object. In such a 
case, the observing eye has to oscillate to scan all the parts of the object, which takes some 
time. The second phase of the visual process (the visual act) is always instantaneous. 
Hence, Olivi understands vision as immediate or successive, depending on what stage of 
the process is emphasized.138 
 
Conclusion 
As I have shown, extramissionist theories did not appear as antiquated and obscure to 
13th century thinkers as they may appear to us. Although Aristotelians, such as Albert the 
Great, refuted the theory, it still appeared considerably credible for Roger Bacon and was 
originally reformulated by Peter Olivi. Neither of them upheld the most problematic 
feature of the theory, viz., the emission of a material entity from the eyes. Both, while 
open-minded to the extramission postulate, manifest a tendency to “dematerialize” 
extramission: according to Bacon, what is emitted is the visual power or the “species of 
the sight”; in Olivi’s view, there is only a virtual extension of the visual power, best to be 
described as attention. 
Albert the Great refuted extramission, but incorporated the notion of a visual 
cone into an intromissionist framework; once the observer has received the species of 
the object, vision immediately occurs. However, he also attempts to include a selective 
 
135Summa II.37, 664. 
136 Summa II.73, 65. 
137 Summa II.26, 451-452; II.89, 209; also Tachau, Vision and Certitude, p. 48. 
138 Olivi, Quodlibeta I.4, 17. 
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attention as “directing” the received species to the thing or its part. Roger Bacon 
presented a syncretic account with a primacy of intromission; extramission has a 
metaphysical function in his account, since it refines the species of the material object and 
helps to bridge the ontological gap between them and the visual organ. Vision is a 
thoroughly successive process for him – not only the multiplication of the species takes 
time (albeit an imperceptible amount of it), but also the certification of vision performed 
by passing the axis of the visual cone over the parts of the object seen. Finally, Peter Olivi 
developed an original rethinking of an extramissionist (predominantly Platonic) visual 
theory. Extramission has a psychological role in his account and the traditional optical 
conceptual equipment (such as the notion of a visual ray) is used to describe attentional 
switching. However, the visual process is not completed by the fixation of attention, but 
by the creation of a visual act (by the power as an efficient cause) and determination of 
its content (by the object as a terminative cause). Whereas the first phase of the visual 
process, viz. attentional switching, can be successive, the second phase, viz. the causation 
of the visual act, is always instantaneous. With a grain of salt, Olivi’s account can be 
described as a Platonic syncretic account with a primacy of extramission.139 
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